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ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
                                 
 
     In this appeal, we must review the application of a 
decision we reached when this case first came before us.  In 
Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir.) 
("Fischer I"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1020 (1993), we reversed 
the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant 
Philadelphia Electric Co. ("PECo"), holding that there were 
genuine issues of material fact as to whether PECo, acting in its 
role as fiduciary under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act ("ERISA"), had made affirmative material misrepresentations 
to its employee-beneficiaries.  The misrepresentations alleged 
were that PECo had denied, or failed to disclose when asked, that 
it was seriously considering an early retirement program.  We 
remanded the case to the district court to determine when PECo 
began to give serious consideration to an early retirement 
program.  Id. at 135. 
     On remand, the district court concluded that PECo was 
seriously considering an early retirement program as of March 12, 
1990.  Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., C.A. No. 90-8020, slip 
op. at 19 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1994) ("District Ct. Op.").  Applying 
Fischer I, the district court held that any employee who sought 
information about retirement benefits during the period from 
March 12, 1990, until the announcement of the plan on April 19, 
1990, and who was told that no change was under consideration, 
had received material misinformation.   
     We find that the district court misunderstood the 
concept of "serious consideration."  We will therefore reverse 
the decision of the district court, and we will enter judgment 
for defendant. 
                                 I. 
     This action arises out of PECo's efforts to cut costs 
and reduce its payroll by implementing an early retirement plan.  
On April 19, 1990, Joseph Paquette, PECo's President and Chief 
Operating Officer, announced in a letter to all employees that he 
would recommend to PECo's Board of Directors that the company cut 
its payroll through early retirement.  On April 26, 1990, PECo 
sent a letter to all employees who had announced an intent to 
retire, suggesting that they delay their retirement until the 
company's early retirement package was finalized.  On May 25, 
1990, PECo's Board of Directors approved a plan, which included 
inducements such as a five year time-in-service credit, a five 
year age credit, and severance pay.  These events caused much 
consternation among employees who had retired in the months 
preceding the plan's announcement. 
     Various pre-plan retirees filed suit in the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging 
that PECo had long known of its intent to offer an early 
retirement package, or at least that it was considering a 
package, and had breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404, 
29 U.S.C. § 1104, by providing material misinformation.  The 
district court certified a class, then entered summary judgment 
for PECo.  In Fischer I, we reversed, holding that PECo could be 
liable for breach of fiduciary duty if the company represented 
that no early retirement plan was being considered at a time when 
the plan was in fact under serious consideration.  944 F.2d at 
133.  We remanded for a trial on the merits; a bench trial 
followed.  The facts we recite here were found by the district 
court; the vast majority were stipulated. 
     PECo had long engaged in a practice of reviewing its 
retirement and pension benefits packages as part of its ordinary 
course of business.  During one such review, on March 21, 1988, 
Fred Beaver, an Administrative Assistant in the Benefits Division 
of Human Resources, prepared a memorandum for Charles Fritz, Vice 
President of Personnel and Industry Relations, on the possibility 
of reducing the size of PECo's work force.  The memorandum 
suggested that a modest "sweetener" could induce approximately 
50% of a target group of workers to retire.  During the same 
period, on May 5, 1988, Michael Crommie, PECo's Director of 
Benefits, contacted William Murdoch, a consultant with Towers, 
Perrin, Forster & Crosby ("TPF&C"), to discuss various early 
retirement options.  Discussions between management and TPF&C 
continued into June. 
     Beaver's memorandum and the TPF&C consultations 
occurred roughly contemporaneously with Joseph Paquette's arrival 
at PECo as president and chief of operations.  Paquette had a 
long term goal of reducing the number of PECo employees, and he 
would ultimately recommend the 1990 early retirement package.  In 
June, 1988, however, Paquette decided against an early retirement 
plan.  At trial, Paquette testified that PECo was then in the 
process of completing one nuclear plant and restarting another.  
He did not want to risk an early retirement program because 
personnel vital to the nuclear effort might leave.  He believed 
that PECo could not legally institute an early retirement plan 
that excluded nuclear plant personnel.  After deciding that no 
early retirement package would be considered, Paquette shifted 
his attention to promoting operational excellence at the company. 
     In July, 1989, PECo requested a rate increase from the 
Public Utility Commission ("PUC").  PUC staff made a preliminary 
recommendation that PECo be granted less than half its requested 
increase.   
     In November, 1989, as part of the operational 
excellence program, PECo hired McKinsey & Co. to explore long- 
term strategies and cost-cutting measures.  Paquette used the 
McKinsey report to calculate the savings that an early retirement 
program could produce. 
     On December 13, 1989, Paquette held three meetings with 
employees to discuss the importance of the rate increase to the 
company.  In response to questions, Paquette stated that an early 
retirement plan might be considered if the rate request was 
denied.  He explained that the company had no plans for such a 
program because the outcome of the rate increase was in doubt.  
Paquette stated that PECo's first option in the event the 
increase was denied would be to appeal the decision but that the 
company would also consider cutting costs and reducing its stock 
dividend.  On March 1, 1990, an Administrative Law Judge issued 
an interim decision recommending that PECo receive 21% of the 
rate increase it had requested. 
     Events accelerated rapidly following the ALJ's 
decision.  On March 12, 1990, Kenneth Lefkowitz, Manager of 
Compensation & Benefits, contacted Murdoch at TPF&C.  Lefkowitz 
stated PECo's concern about its rate case before the PUC and the 
need to reduce costs quickly.  The question of an early 
retirement sweetener was mentioned as a possible method.  TPF&C 
had done no work for PECo on early retirement plans since June, 
1988, nor had TPF&C been asked to prepare contingency plans in 
case PECo's rate request was denied.  On March 20, 1990, 
Lefkowitz asked TPF&C to develop a set of early retirement 
alternatives.  On March 28, 1990, Murdoch proposed three 
alternative programs, the first of which resembled the 1988 
program in some respects, although it targeted a different group 
of eligible employees and contained different severance 
provisions.  On April 2, 5, and 6, Murdoch had further 
discussions with PECo personnel about the details of the early 
retirement sweetener.  On April 7, senior PECo executives 
attended a corporate strategy meeting.  Notes from the meeting 
indicated a statement by Paquette that on April 20 he would issue 
a letter announcing a $100 million cost cutting program.  On 
April 13, 1990, TPF&C provided PECo with a survey of early 
retirement plans used by other utilities.  On April 19, 1990, the 
PUC granted less than 50% of PECo's rate request.  Paquette then 
sent the letter to PECo employees announcing his intent to 
recommend an early retirement package. 
     Based on these findings, the district court held that 
PECo began seriously considering an early retirement plan on 
March 12, 1990.  The district court entered judgment for those 
retirees who asked about an early retirement plan and retired 
after March 12.  It entered judgment for PECo on the claims of 
those retirees who asked about retirement and retired before that 
date.  Both PECo and the plaintiff class appealed.  The plaintiff 
class appeals the district court's determination that serious 
consideration of the early retirement plan did not begin before 
March 12, 1990.  PECo, on the other hand, asserts that serious 
consideration did not begin until after March 12, 1990. 
                               II. 
     Our analysis proceeds within the confines of Fischer I.  
In that decision, we established the general rule that governs 
interactions between a company-as-fiduciary and its employee- 
beneficiaries regarding changes in benefits:  "A plan 
administrator may not make affirmative material 
misrepresentations to plan participants about changes to an 
employee pension benefits plan.  Put simply, when a plan 
administrator speaks, it must speak truthfully."  994 F.2d at 
135.  This overarching duty of truthfulness forms an important 
part of our ERISA jurisprudence.  See In re Unisys Corp. Retiree 
Medical Benefit "ERISA" Litig., 57 F.3d 1255, 1266-67 (3d Cir. 
1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1316 (1996); Bixler 
v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 
1302-03 (3d Cir. 1994). 
     The rule of truthfulness that we announced in Fischer Ifocused on the 
materiality of a plan administrator's 
misrepresentations.  We defined materiality as a mixed question 
of law and fact, ultimately turning on whether "there is a 
substantial likelihood that [the misrepresentation] would mislead 
a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed decision 
about if and when to retire."  Id. at 135.  We further explained 
that  
     [i]ncluded within the overall materiality inquiry will 
     be an inquiry into the seriousness with which a 
     particular change to an employee pension plan is being 
     considered at the time the misrepresentation is made.  
     All else equal, the more seriously a plan change is 
     being considered, the more likely a misrepresentation, 
     e.g., that no change is under consideration, will pass 
     the threshold of materiality. 
 
Id. 
     In the current case, as in any case where the 
misrepresentation in question is the statement that no change in 
benefits is under consideration, the only factor at issue is the 
degree of seriousness with which the change was in fact being 
considered.  This factor controls the materiality test:  "[T]he 
more seriously a plan change is being considered, the more likely 
a misrepresentation . . . will pass the threshold of 
materiality."  Id.  Serious consideration forms the crux of the 
inquiry.  See Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 136, 140 
(3d Cir.) ("Kurz I") ("PECo is entitled to argue . . . that the 
statements it allegedly made were not material because at the 
time those statements were made, the amendment to the plan was 
not under serious consideration"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1020 
(1993); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 
(6th Cir. 1988) ("when serious consideration was given to 
implementing [improved benefits, the company] had a fiduciary 
duty not to make misrepresentations, either negligently or 
intentionally, to potential plan participants concerning the 
[change]"); see also Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 
54 F.3d 1488, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding allegation of 
company's denial of early retirement plan when plan was under 
serious consideration sufficient to state claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty); Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (same, following Fischer I); cf. Vartanian v. Monsanto 
Co., 14 F.3d 697, 702 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding plaintiff had 
standing to assert claim for company's misrepresentations when 
retirement plan was under serious consideration); Barnes v. Lacy, 
927 F.2d 539, 544 (11th Cir.) (noting that if a company "after 
serious consideration of a second [plan]" represented that no 
change was being considered, "such a representation would be 
characterized as a material misrepresentation"), cert. denied, 
502 U.S. 938 (1991). 
     Although the test we set out in Fischer I ultimately 
turned on "serious consideration," we paid little attention to 
the details of that term.  We offered nothing in the way of a 
definition, standard, or even factors to consider.  We simply 
remanded the case to the district court, leaving to the district 
judge the task of determining when PECo's consideration became 
serious.  We commend his efforts to apply this amorphous concept.  
We will now provide further guidance on the meaning of "serious 
consideration." 
     The concept of "serious consideration" recognizes and 
moderates the tension between an employee's right to information 
and an employer's need to operate on a day-to-day basis.  Every 
business must develop strategies, gather information, evaluate 
options, and make decisions.  Full disclosure of each step in 
this process is a practical impossibility.  Moreover, as counsel 
for PECo emphasized at oral argument, large corporations 
regularly review their benefit packages as part of an on-going 
process of cost-monitoring and personnel management.  The various 
levels of management are constantly considering changes in 
corporate benefit plans.  A corporation could not function if 
ERISA required complete disclosure of every facet of these on- 
going activities.  Consequently, our holding in Fischer Irequires 
disclosure only when a change in benefits comes under 
serious consideration. 
     Equally importantly, serious consideration protects 
employees.  Every employee has a need for material information on 
which that employee can rely in making employment decisions.  Too 
low a standard could result in an avalanche of notices and 
disclosures.  For employees at a company like PECo, which 
regularly reviews its benefits plans, truly material information 
could easily be missed if the flow of information was too great.  
The warning that a change in benefits was under serious 
consideration would become meaningless if cried too often.  
     We demonstrated our awareness of these competing 
policies in Fischer I.  Although our decision was clearly driven 
by an employee's need for truthful information, we nevertheless 
recognized a concomitant "right [of] an employer to make the 
business decision of how much and when to enhance pension 
benefits."  994 F.2d at 133.  Later in the opinion, we expressed 
similar sentiments, cautioning that 
     ERISA does not impose a duty of clairvoyance on 
     fiduciaries.  An ERISA fiduciary is under no obligation 
     to offer precise predictions about future changes to 
     its plan.  Rather, its obligation is to answer 
     participants' questions forthrightly, a duty that does 
     not require the fiduciary to disclose its internal 
     deliberations nor interfere with the substantive 
     aspects of the collective bargaining process. 
Id. at 135 (citations omitted).  Other courts of appeals have 
likewise emphasized the absence of any "duty of clairvoyance," as 
well as the fact that disclosure does not extend to internal 
deliberations.  See Swinney v. General Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 
520 (6th Cir. 1995); Mullins, 23 F.3d at 669; Drennan v. General 
Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
508 U.S. 940 (1993); Barnes 927 F.2d at 544; Berlin, 858 F.2d at 
1164. 
     In light of these concerns, we believe that the 
following formulation of serious consideration is appropriate:  
Serious consideration of a change in plan benefits exists when 
(1) a specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of 
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to 
implement the change.  We draw this formulation primarily from 
the excellent opinions of Judge Weiner in the current case, seeDistrict 
Ct. Op. at 17, and Judge Katz in Zschunke v. Bell 
Atlantic Corp., 872 F. Supp. 1395, 1401 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 
70 F.3d 1259 (3d Cir. 1995).  Consistent with our decision in 
Fischer I's companion case, this formulation does not turn on any 
single factor; the determination is inherently fact-specific.  
Kurz I, 994 F.2d at 139.  Likewise, the factors themselves are 
not isolated criteria; the three interact and coalesce to form a 
composite picture of serious consideration.  For purposes of 
discussion, we address each in turn. 
     The first element, a specific proposal, distinguishes 
serious consideration from the antecedent steps of gathering 
information, developing strategies, and analyzing options.  A 
company must necessarily go through these preliminary steps 
before its deliberations can reach the serious stage.  This 
factor does not mean, however, that the proposal must describe 
the plan in its final form.  A specific proposal can contain 
several alternatives, and the plan as finally implemented may 
differ somewhat from the proposal.  What is required, consistent 
with the overall test, is a specific proposal that is 
sufficiently concrete to support consideration by senior 
management for the purpose of implementation. 
     The second element, discussion for implementation, 
further distinguishes serious consideration from the preliminary 
steps of gathering data and formulating strategy.  It also 
protects the ability of senior management to take a role in the 
early phases of the process without automatically triggering a 
duty of disclosure.  This factor recognizes that a corporate 
executive can order an analysis of benefits alternatives or 
commission a comparative study without seriously considering 
implementing a change in benefits.  Preliminary stages may also 
require interaction among upper level management, company 
personnel, and outside consultants.  These discussions are 
properly assigned to the preliminary stages of company 
deliberations.  Consideration becomes serious when the subject 
turns to the practicalities of implementation. 
     The final element, consideration by senior management 
with the authority to implement the change, ensures that the 
analysis of serious consideration focuses on the proper actors 
within the corporate hierarchy.  As noted, large corporate 
entities conduct regular or on-going reviews of their benefit 
packages in their ordinary course of business.  These entities 
employ individuals, including middle and upper-level management 
employees, to gather information and conduct reviews.  The 
periodic review process may also entail contacting outside 
consultants or commissioning studies.  During the course of their 
employment, the employees assigned these tasks necessarily 
discuss their duties and the results of their studies.  These 
discussions may include issues of implementation.  The employees 
may also make recommendations to upper level management or senior 
executives.  As a general rule, such operations will not 
constitute serious consideration.  These activities are merely 
the ordinary duties of the employees.  Until senior management 
addresses the issue, the company has not yet seriously considered 
a change. 
     Consideration by senior management is also limited to 
those executives who possess the authority to implement the 
proposed change.  This focus on authority can be used to identify 
the proper cadre of senior management, but it should not limit 
serious consideration to deliberations by a quorum of the Board 
of Directors, typically the only corporate body that in a literal 
sense has the power to implement changes in benefits packages.  
It is sufficient for this factor that the plan be considered by 
those members of senior management with responsibility for the 
benefits area of the business, and who ultimately will make 
recommendations to the Board regarding benefits operations. 
     At the risk of redundancy, we stress that these factors 
do not establish a bright-line rule.  In Kurz I, we expressly 
rejected the suggestion that serious consideration could be tied 
to any single objective event.  994 F.2d at 139.  Our decision 
today, which merely elaborates on Fischer I and Kurz I, contrasts 
markedly with a true bright-line rule, such as that recently 
adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  ComparePocchia v. 
NYNEX Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting 
bright-line rule where employee fails to request information 
about changes in benefits, finding no duty to disclose changes 
until new plan goes into effect), with Mullins v. Pfizer, Inc., 
23 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1994) (following Fischer I and 
adopting materiality standard for affirmative 
misrepresentations).  The elements that we have outlined limit 
serious consideration to the latter stages of corporate decision- 
making, but they remain flexible and fact-specific. 
     We believe that our explanation of serious 
consideration maintains the balance struck in Fischer I.  Our 
formulation respects the division of responsibility in corporate 
entities and the day-to-day realities of running a business.  
Even more importantly, it protects the right of employees to 
material information.  Characterizing serious consideration in 
this fashion ensures that disclosures to employees about 
potential changes in benefits will be meaningful.  Employees will 
learn of potential changes when the company's deliberations have 
reached a level where an employee should reasonably factor the 
potential change into an employment decision.  This guarantees 
that employees will have the information they need, while 
avoiding a surfeit of meaningless disclosures.  Finally, as a 
matter of policy, we note that imposing liability too quickly for 
failure to disclose a potential early retirement plan could harm 
employees by deterring employers from resorting to such plans.  
See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 279 ("If fiduciaries were required to 
disclose such a business strategy, it would necessarily fail.  
Employees simply would not leave if they were informed that 
improved benefits were planned if workforce reductions were 
insufficient."); cf. Swinney, 46 F.3d at 520 ("Changing 
circumstances, such as the need to reduce labor costs, might 
require an employer to sweeten its severance package, and an 
employer should not be forever deterred from giving its employees 
a better deal merely because it did not clearly indicate to a 
previous employee that a better deal might one day be 
proposed.").  Our formulation avoids forcing companies into 
layoffs, the primary alternative to retirement inducements.  This 
further protects the interests of workers. 
                               III. 
     Having explained our understanding of serious 
consideration, we now apply it to the case at bar.  Although we 
would ordinarily remand to allow the district court to apply our 
standard in the first instance, we see no need in the current 
case.  Judge Weiner's thoughtful opinion has set out clearly the 
necessary factual findings, and we can simply apply the law to 
reach the requisite conclusion.  Based on our three factor test, 
we find that serious consideration began on April 7, 1990.  We 
will therefore reverse the district court to the extent that it 
found serious consideration as of March 12, 1990. 
         The district court correctly dismissed events prior to 
March 12, 1990, as failing to rise to the level of serious 
consideration.  Any potential consideration of an early 
retirement program prior to June, 1988, was conclusively ended by 
Paquette's decision to forego an early retirement option and 
focus on operational excellence.  These events had no bearing on 
the subsequent decision to implement an early retirement plan in 
August, 1990. 
         The district court was equally correct to dispose of 
Paquette's statements during his speeches to employees on 
December 13, 1989.  Paquette responded truthfully to employee 
questions regarding PECo's potential responses to an adverse 
decision in the rates case.  Paquette explained that PECo would 
first appeal the decision but might also have to consider cutting 
costs by reducing its stock dividend or other methods.  This is 
the type of frank response to employee concerns that should be 
encouraged.  Paquette's statements will not support an inference 
that an early retirement plan was then under serious 
consideration.  
         The district court then concluded that PECo began 
seriously considering a plan sometime between December and April.  
Citing Lefkowitz's March 12, 1990, telephone call to TPF&C as the 
earliest example of affirmative action to implement the plan, the 
district court marked the start of serious consideration on that 
date.  Under our three factor inquiry, this is incorrect. 
         As we have explained, serious consideration requires 
(1) a specific proposal (2) discussed for purposes of 
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to 
implement the change.  In the case at bar, these three factors 
did not coincide until April 7, 1990, when senior PECo management 
met to discuss the TPF&C report on staff reduction options.  The 
TPF&C report is an excellent example of a specific proposal.  
This document outlined various early retirement alternatives and 
served as the basis for management's deliberations.  Senior 
management was present at the meeting.  The subject of the 
meeting was corporate strategy, and meeting notes indicate that 
Paquette disclosed his intent to announce $100 million in cost 
cuts.  Both facts suggest that an early retirement plan was 
discussed for purposes of implementation at the April 7 meeting. 
         Events prior to April 7, by contrast, do not rise to 
the level of serious consideration.  The March 12 Lefkowitz 
telephone call is clearly insufficient.  First, the substance of 
the March 12 call involved nothing more than a general discussion 
of early retirement options.  Lefkowitz was reestablishing 
contact on a subject where TPF&C had done no work since 1988.  
The subject matter of the contact was therefore preliminary.  
Second, Lefkowitz was a middle management employee in PECo's 
benefits department.  His official duties entailed monitoring 
PECo's benefits package and exploring potential changes.  Nothing 
in the record indicates that, when Lefkowitz made his March 12 
telephone call to TPF&C, he was doing anything more than acting 
within the scope of his normal duties.  This type of action by a 
middle management employee is preliminary.  Third, even if 
Lefkowitz were acting on orders from senior management, his call 
to TPF&C would still fall under the rubric of gathering 
information.  Senior management is free to start the process of 
exploration and evaluation without immediately triggering a duty 
of disclosure.  For each of these reasons, the March 12 phone 
call took place prior to serious consideration.  The district 
court was therefore incorrect. 
         The March 20 contact between Lefkowitz and TPF&C 
confirms this conclusion.  It was on March 20 that Lefkowitz 
asked TPF&C to develop a set of options for staff reduction, 
including various early retirement plans.  This is crucial.  
Serious consideration can only begin after information is 
gathered and options developed.  The record indicates that the 
March 20 phone call assigned TPF&C the task of developing 
options.  This contact therefore preceded serious consideration. 
         Events between March 20 and April 7 can similarly be 
categorized under preliminary stages such as information 
gathering and strategy formulation.  The record indicates that 
Murdoch, a partner at TPF&C, met with Lefkowitz and other PECo 
executives during this period.  These meetings are consistent 
with TPF&C's efforts to develop a report for PECo, the very task 
it had been assigned on March 20.  The fact that TPF&C submitted 
its report on April 2 removes any lingering doubt.  It was only 
after April 2 that a specific proposal existed. 
         Given that TPF&C submitted its report on April 2, the 
meetings that occurred on April 2, 5, and 6 between Murdoch, 
Paquette, and other PECo management present a closer question.  A 
proposal had been developed and PECo management was involved in 
the meetings.  However, details of the proposals were still being 
discussed.  On April 7, a corporate strategy meeting was held.  
Paquette stated at the meeting that he would announce targets and 
programs on April 20.  Based on this clear example of a meeting 
of senior PECo executives to address the early retirement issue 
at a time when a specific proposal had been submitted, we 
conclude that serious consideration began on April 7, 1990. 
         Under the rule established in Fischer I, any employee 
who asked about a potential early retirement plan after serious 
consideration began on April 7, 1990, but before the plan's 
formal announcement on April 19, 1990, received material 
misinformation.  Such an employee would have established a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.  However, all of the 
members of the plaintiff class retired before this period.  We 
will, therefore, enter judgment for PECo on the plaintiff's 
breach of fiduciary duty claim. 
                               IV. 
     The plaintiff class raised two alternative theories of 
liability which we will discuss briefly.  Neither has merit. 
     First, the plaintiff class proceeded on an alternative 
theory of common law estoppel.  To establish a claim for 
equitable estoppel under ERISA, a plaintiff must prove:  (1) a 
material representation, (2) reasonable and detrimental reliance 
upon the representation, and (3) extraordinary circumstances.  
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 235 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  We need look no further than the first element.  
Because no change in the plan was under serious consideration at 
the time the members of the plaintiff class requested 
information, no material representations were made.  The estoppel 
claim fails. 
     Second, the plaintiffs argue that PECo engaged in 
conduct violative of ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140.  Section 510 
provides: 
          It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, 
     fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate 
     against a participant or beneficiary for exercising any 
     right to which he is entitled . . . or for the purpose 
     of interfering with the attainment of any right to 
     which such participants may become entitled . . ..  It 
     shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
     suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person 
     because he has given information or has testified or is 
     about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating 
     to this chapter . . .. 
29 U.S.C. § 1140.  To recover under this provision, an employee 
must show "(1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the 
purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to 
which the employee may become entitled."  Gavalik v. Continental 
Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 852 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 979 
(1987); see also Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 922 
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920 (1991).  None of these 
elements are present in the current case. 
     Nothing in the record suggests that PECo engaged in 
prohibited employer conduct.  PECo attempted none of the actions 
listed in § 510 as giving rise to a discrimination claim.  None 
of the employees were "discharge[d], fine[d], suspend[ed], 
expel[led], [or] discipline[d]."  They were simply allowed to 
retire when they wished.  Nor were the class members 
"discriminate[d] against."  PECo treated the class members no 
differently from any other workers.  It announced the early 
retirement program to all employees at the same time after the 
April 7 meeting of senior management.  As a result, the plaintiff 
class has failed to make out a claim under § 510. 
     In addition, under the law of this circuit, suits for 
discrimination under § 510 are "limited to actions affecting the 
employer-employee relationship," not mere changes in the level of 
benefits.  Haberern v. Kaupp Vascular Surgeons Ltd. Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan, 24 F.3d 1491, 1503 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1099 (1995).  PECo's early 
retirement offer only changed the benefit level of its pension 
plan; the plan did not alter PECo's relationship with its 
retirees. 
     Finally, nothing in the record indicates that PECo had 
the requisite intent for a discriminatory violation.  To recover 
under § 510, a plaintiff must show that the defendant had a 
specific intent to violate ERISA.  "Proof of incidental loss of 
benefits as a result of a termination will not constitute a 
violation of § 510."  812 F.2d at 851 (citations omitted). 
     For each of these reasons, the plaintiff class has 
failed to make out a claim for discrimination under ERISA § 510.  
As noted, the plaintiff class has also failed to make out a claim 
for common law estoppel.  We will reverse the holding of the 
district court on both counts. 
                                V. 
     Under the rule in Fischer I, PECo's liability turns on 
the point at which serious consideration began.  Applying our 
understanding of serious consideration, we find that serious 
consideration began on April 7, 1990.  Because all the members of 
the plaintiff class retired before this date, none were provided 
with material misinformation.  The class's alternative theories 
of recovery likewise fail.  We will reverse the holding of the 
district court and enter judgment for the defendant. 
